Zimbabwe’s Constitutional Amendments and the Politics of Succession

By Shlton Muchena

The Zimbabwe’s proposed constitutional amendments are being presented as technical adjustments to governance. A closer reading, however, suggests something far more consequential. To many political observers, the changes point not to reform, but to a carefully managed reconfiguration of power.
These amendments are not just constitutional but systems tactical laid out to manage succession politics in ZANU PF.
And at the centre of this analysis is businessman Kudakwashe Tagwirei, who is increasingly viewed as the largest potential beneficiary of the proposed amendments.
The most controversial proposal is the clause that allows Members of Parliament to elect the President. This would mark a profound shift in Zimbabwe’s democratic architecture, transferring the ultimate decision of leadership from millions of voters to a few hundred legislators. Critics argue that such a system favours influence, patronage, and financial power over popular legitimacy.
Under this model, public electability becomes secondary. Parliamentary loyalty can be cultivated, negotiated, or secured through elite networks. Analysts note that Tagwirei, widely regarded as lacking mass electoral appeal, would be structurally advantaged in such a framework. The amendment effectively lowers the barrier to the presidency for individuals whose strength lies in economic leverage rather than public support.
The proposed amendment to Section 212 reinforces this interpretation. That section currently functions as a constraint on political overreach within state institutions. Altering it would reduce institutional resistance and smooth the path for elite-driven succession planning. Taken together, the amendments appear less like isolated legal updates and more like components of a long-term political design.
Within this context, the recent removal of former Information Minister Jenfan Muswere takes on added significance. While officially unexplained, his dismissal is widely interpreted as punitive. Allegations circulating within political circles suggest Muswere’s downfall is linked to his associations with Tungwarara and an attempt to position himself as an intermediary in arranging a meeting with President Emmerson Mnangagwa. The reported refusal by the President to meet them was followed swiftly by Muswere’s removal, reinforcing perceptions of tightened control over political access and mediation.
For analysts, the message is clear. In Zimbabwe’s current political climate, unsanctioned ambition is costly, and loyalty is carefully policed.
As Zimbabwe approaches 2030, the constitutional amendments raise urgent questions about the country’s democratic trajectory. Who benefits from a system that weakens public participation? Who gains when institutions are reshaped to serve succession rather than accountability?
Constitutions are not neutral documents. They reflect power, intention, and foresight. In Zimbabwe’s case, the proposed amendments are increasingly being read not as reforms for governance, but as preparations for transition.